What keeps you up at night is rarely your biggest problem
Thomas Lechl on Bergzeit's path to automated logistics, what really mattered along the way – and what others can learn from it.

When Bergzeit wanted to automate its own logistics in 2019, the idea had long been in the drawer. What was actually implemented was a new warehouse hall with shuttle technology, conveyor systems and revised pick-pack structures – planned before the pandemic, built and commissioned during it .
In conversation, logistics manager Thomas Lechl explains what really mattered in implementation, what went wrong, but also what went well or exactly right – and why precisely this mix forms the foundation of a functioning facility today. Anyone wanting to understand what automation projects look like in practice gets honest answers, concrete learnings and plenty of between-the-lines experience.
Johanna: Thomas, we want to talk about your automation project. Bring us up to speed: when and under what conditions did you decide back then to automate at all?
Thomas: The decision actually emerged quite early – even before it became concrete. When we bought the company premises in 2017 and planned the first logistics construction phase, we already thought structurally about having a second expansion phase with automation. Of course we didn't yet know exactly what that would be – but we kept areas free, planned for connections, made hall sections plannable.
When I joined in 2018, the topic was already on the table. I was hired with the clear goal of helping shape this next step. I was told: "We're growing, we have a phased concept – but it's not yet fully developed. That's where your experience should come in." And that's exactly how it was.
Why didn't you tackle the topic directly in 2017?
Back then Bergzeit was still a much smaller company. In terms of revenue we were perhaps at 30, 40 million euros – that still felt like startup level. The idea was clearly there: "In a few years we want to crack the 100 million mark", but whether you actually trust such growth is another matter.
We prepared a lot in planning, but consciously decided against direct implementation. Also because the professionalism wasn't there yet in the company. There were many internal people who had built the thing up – but still little experienced management.
Such projects need experience and a clear setup. That's why we initially worked with manual processes, but in a way that would allow us to upgrade later.
You said the project was already announced when you were hired. Was that an incentive for you?
Absolutely. I come from a corporate environment, spent many years in logistics at an SDAX company. There you also have creative scope – but within very clear structures. If you want to do a big project there, you often have to ask what feels like 30 people and go through ten committees.
> At Bergzeit it was different. I knew: here you can not only think about things, but also realize them. Of course you have to coordinate – but it's fast, direct and solution-oriented. That really appealed to me.
Then in 2019 concrete planning started. How did you make the system decision?
First of all with a partner who supported us in planning. We decided relatively quickly that it should be shuttle technology. We could rule out other systems early on.
Then we went on reference trips: to Holland, Austria, to other projects in Germany. We wanted to see how others do it, what works, what doesn't. These visits were incredibly valuable for us – much more than presentations or brochures. In the end we had three Vendors on the shortlist, when suddenly the lockdown came.
How did you decide in this situation? Many would probably have stopped the project for the time being.
Our shareholders said: "The pandemic won't slow us down." They were very clear about that. And honestly: this attitude really helped us.
We said: if we place the order now, the company gets utilization – and we're ready. We also communicated openly: "This isn't a dumping order now – but we're serious." In retrospect it was a good decision. Because what came next was a huge wave of demand.
How did that specifically impact things?
We're an online retailer for outdoor equipment – and in the pandemic suddenly everyone wanted to go outside. Travel wasn't possible, stores were closed – but hiking, cycling, ski touring were. People had time, they had money – and they ordered.
At times we were 40, 50 percent above plan. And the project was running in parallel. Of course that was an enormous burden for the operational team – but we could separate it cleanly: the warehouse handles daily business, the project team plans the future.
How did implementation go then – what were the biggest stumbling blocks?
The steel construction was brutal. That dragged on forever. The first contractor went bankrupt, then new construction crews came, wrong deliveries, delays. That alone took eight months. And you think: "Just make some progress!"
> Because it all took so long, the follow-up trades also got nervous: fire protection, conveyor technology, sprinklers. They said: "If you don't finish now, we're on to the next project – and then we won't be back so quickly."
Were there also smaller glitches that cost you disproportionately much?
Oh yes – the IPAK machine. It was supposed to simply be delivered and brought in. Instead the truck sank into the mud in front of the hall, the door opening was too small, and the assembly team only spoke French. Not a word of English, not a word of German.
It was one continuous misunderstanding. At some point it was: "Thomas, we need you as an escalation level on the construction site." And I just thought: "What am I supposed to accomplish there now?" But that's just part of it.
How did you guide your warehouse team through this change process?
Early and transparently. We explained what we were planning in regular meetings and updates. And then at some point came the moment when I stood on the floor and said: "If you look out there, you'll soon see excavators. And that's a good thing – because without them, we'll soon have a real problem."
It was important to make clear: this isn't a downsizing project, but a step to remain operational. And I think because we communicated that honestly, there was hardly any resistance.
We planned training early – not just technical, but also to take away fears. Because when you change processes, questions come up. And sometimes worries too.
How did the go-live go when it actually came to implementation?
At the beginning everything went surprisingly smoothly – but precisely because we went too slowly. Our plan was to ramp up gradually: first one aisle, then gradually more. And under these conditions it ran right away. No errors, no problems. Almost a bit too smooth.
The real learnings only came when we really put load on it – several aisles in parallel, more volume, real dynamics.
> That's when it became clear: we should have stepped on the gas much earlier. This gentle start-up held us back to some extent. Real operation only shows itself under full load.
What exactly did you learn in this phase?
For example, that shipping bags are problematic on conveyor systems. They run unsteadily, block, m
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